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STAMFORD, Conn. — Almost a year ago, just after my tenure as chairman of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel had come to an end, I testified before Congress about the safety of the space shuttle program. My remarks contained both praise and concern, and I closed with a warning: No danger was imminent, but the risk for future missions would almost certainly increase if NASA was unable to pursue its long-term safety strategy.
Since the horror of last Saturday, I have been asked if my fears were realized and whether my warning was ignored. I do not believe so. Several disturbing trends had developed by the time of my testimony, but not once in my 15 years on the panel did I doubt NASA's dedication to safety or its vigilance in maintaining it. I was more worried about the federal government's commitment to supporting NASA's manned spaceflight efforts.
In the years between the Challenger disaster in 1986 and last Saturday, NASA and the space shuttle program underwent numerous structural changes. But the one principle that remained in the forefront among everyone who worked on the shuttle was the drive for safety; after the Challenger the mantra was, "Never again." There were many assaults on this steadfast position, like the need to spend money on the International Space Station, but they were never allowed to supplant safety.
After the post-Challenger return to flight, however, political interest in the space shuttle seemed to wane. In an era of government cutbacks and diminished public attention, generous NASA budgets could not be sustained forever. The space station was an ambitious program that required a large part of NASA's budget. Other programs like the X-33 experimental space plane, which were specifically required by Congress, diverted funds from the shuttle.
In response, NASA and its contractors found ways to do more with less — always with an eye to safety. We on the panel monitored their efforts and marveled at their ability to continue to meet all requirements while having their resources repeatedly cut.
Eventually, however, there wasn't much more that could be taken from current operations. The unexpected costs of the space station worsened the situation. Thus the only choice for those in charge of the space shuttle was to reduce or delay expenditures meant to assure the long-term health of the program.
For example, the aging infrastructure on the ground, much of it a legacy from the Apollo program, was neglected. The stated rationale was that, since the space shuttle was scheduled to be replaced by about 2012, long-term investment was not cost effective. Yet no replacement vehicle was even on the drawing board, and no new technologies were available to support the development of a radically different and safer vehicle.
By the turn of the century, it had become clear to those of us on the panel that a potential safety problem was emerging. Aging shuttles can be safely flown as long as necessary if they are carefully maintained and appropriately upgraded to avoid obsolescence. As safety advocates, we became uneasy at the deferral or cancellation of safety improvements. Make no mistake: flight safety still received the highest priority. But opportunities to reduce future risk even further were slipping away.
Meanwhile, the NASA budget continued to be squeezed, and delays in the construction of the space station made it clear that the shuttle would be needed until at least 2020 and beyond; there simply was no other vehicle that could do the job. In early 2001, the panel recommended that NASA adopt more realistic long-term plans so that more safety upgrades could be initiated. NASA welcomed the proposal but allowed it to languish; it simply did not have enough money to do very much about it.
My concerns grew. I knew how good the NASA team was, but I also knew it couldn't go on pulling rabbits out of a hat forever. Also, the window of opportunity for addressing the long-term issues was beginning to close. Upgrades to the shuttle take years to plan, engineer, execute and certify. In order to reverse this distressing trend, Congress, the White House and NASA would all have to work together, first to allocate more money and then to use it wisely.
The House hearing last spring provided me with the chance to make this point. I wasn't predicting an imminent accident; I was providing an early warning. That the Columbia tragedy happened less than a year after my testimony was an unfortunate coincidence.
Now is not the time for recriminations. Once we know how the accident happened, we can ask why. After that we can ponder what I — and everyone else on the panel and at NASA and in Congress — could have done. Then we should all do whatever we can to help rekindle the nation's support for the shuttle so that brave flight crews and dedicated ground personnel can get back to doing what they do better than anyone else on the planet: putting humans into space and returning them safely to Earth

SOURCE  Emerging Technologies Limited  

CO:  Emerging Technologies Limited

ST:  New York

SU:  TDS

www.prnewswire.com

01/31/2003 10:27 EST